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Abstract
Identifying the infection sources in a network, including the index cases that introduce a contagious disease
into a population network, the servers that inject a computer virus into a computer network, or the individuals who
started a rumor in a social network, plays a critical role in limiting the damage caused by the infection through
timely quarantine of the sources. We consider the problem of estimating the infection sources and the infection
regions (subsets of nodes infected by each source) in a network, based only on knowledge of which nodes are
infected and their connections, and when the number of sources is unknown a priori. We derive estimators for the
infection sources and their infection regions based on approximations of the infection sequences count. We prove
that if there are at most two infection sources in a geometric tree, our estimator identifies the true source or sources
with probability going to one as the number of infected nodes increases. When there are more than two infection
sources, and when the maximum possible number of infection sources is known, we propose an algorithm with
quadratic complexity to estimate the actual number and identities of the infection sources. Simulations on various
kinds of networks, including tree networks, small-world networks and real world power grid networks, and tests on
two real data sets are provided to verify the performance of our estimators.
Index Terms
Source estimation, infection graphs, inference algorithms, security, sensor networks, social networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With rapid urbanization and advancements in transportation technologies, the world has become more inter-
connected. A contagious disease like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) can spread quickly through a
population and lead to an epidemic [1]. It is crucial to quickly identify the index cases of a contagious disease
since it allows us to study the causes, and hence facilitate the search for antiviral drugs and efficacious therapies.
Moreover, by inferring the the set of individuals infected by each source, potential containment policies can be
formulated to prevent further spreading of the disease due to new index cases [2], [3]. In a similar vein, a computer
virus on a few servers of a computer network can quickly spread to other servers or computers in the network.
This research was supported by the MOE AcRF Tier 1 Grant M52040000. W. Luo, W. P. Tay and M. Leng are with the Nanyang
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2Without prompt identification and isolation of the source servers, significant damage can result [4], [5]. Identifying
the servers in the network that are first infected also allows us to detect the latent points of weaknesses in the
computer network so that preventive measures can be taken to enhance the protection at these points. The source
identification problem also arises in the study of rumor spreading in a social network. A rumor started by a few
individuals can spread quickly through the underlying social network [6]–[9]. In many cases, we are interested
to find the sources of the rumor. For example, law enforcement agencies may be interested in identifying the
perpetrators who fabricate false information to manipulate the market prices of certain stocks.
We can model all the above examples as an infection spreading in a network of nodes. In a population network,
the infection is the disease that is transmitted between individuals. In the example of a computer virus spreading
in a network, the infection is the computer virus, while for the case of a rumor spreading in a social network,
the infection is the rumor. We consider the problem of estimating the infection sources in a network of infected
nodes. We are interested in the scenario where the only given information is the set of infected nodes and their
connections. This is because typically, complete data about the infection spreading process, like the first times
when the infection is detected at each node, is not available. Even when such detection times are available, the
naive method of declaring the first detected node in the network as the sole infection source is often incorrect, as
the infection may have a random dormant period, the length of which varies from node to node. For example, the
spreading of a disease in a population with individuals having varying degrees of resistance, and hence exhibiting
symptoms not necessarily in the order in which they are infected, presents such a problem. Our goal is to construct
estimators for both the infection sources and their infection regions, i.e., the subset of nodes likely to be infected
by each source, when the number and locations of the sources are unknown a priori.
A. Related Works
Existing works related to infection spreading in a network have primarily focused on the parameters of the
diffusion process such as the outbreak thresholds and the effect of network structures [10]–[13]. Little work has
been done on identifying the infection sources. Our aim is to identify a set of nodes most likely to be the infection
sources after the infection has spread for some time. This formulation is of interest in various practical scenarios,
including the spreading of a new disease in a population network. By identifying the initial infectious sources, we
can focus scarce resources like DNA testing on a small select group of patients instead of on the whole population.
Other examples include identifying the initial entry points of a computer virus into a computer network, and the
initiators of a rumor in a social network.
The case where there is a single infection source has been studied in [14]. Based only on the knowledge of
which nodes are infected and the underlying network structure, an estimator based on the linear extensions count
of a poset or the number of infection sequences (cf. Section II) was derived to identify the most likely infection
source. It was shown in [14] that finding a single infection source is a #P-complete problem even in the case where
the infection is relatively simple, with infection from an infected node being equally likely to be transmitted to
3any of its neighbors at each time step. This simple infection model is based on the classical susceptible-infected
(SI) model [15], which has been widely used in modeling viral epidemics [16]–[21]. An algorithm for evaluating
the single source estimator was proposed in [14], and it was shown to have complexity1 O(n) for tree networks,
where n is the total number of infected nodes. Furthermore, it was shown that this estimator performs well in a
very general class of tree networks known as the geometric trees (cf. Section III-D), and identifies the infection
source with probability going to one as n increases.
In many applications, there may be more than one infection source in the network. For example, an infectious
disease may be brought into a country through multiple individuals. Multiple individuals may collude in spreading
a rumor or malicious piece of information in a social network. In this paper, we investigate the case where there
may be multiple infection sources, and when the number of infection sources is unknown a priori. We also consider
the problem of estimating the infection region of each source, and show that a direct application of the algorithm
in [14] performs significantly worse than our proposed algorithms if there are more than one infection sources.
We also note that [14] provides theoretical performance measures for several classes of tree networks, which we
are unable to do here except for the class of geometric trees, because of the greater complexity of our proposed
algorithms. Instead, we provide simulation results to verify the performance of our algorithms.
A related problem is the detection and localization of diffusive sources using wireless sensor networks [22]–[27].
The diffusion models used under this framework are based on spatio-temporal diffusion models [22] or state-space
models with linear dynamics [23], where information like the physical positions of sensors are known. There is
no natural translation of the source detection and localization problem in a sensor network to other networks like
a computer network, without performing discretization and introducing a combinatorial aspect to the problem, as
is done in [28] and [29]. Similarly, inference of viral epidemic processes in populations has been studied in [10],
[12], [15], where various features related to the propagation of a viral epidemic, such as the rates of infection
and the length of latency periods are investigated. These works’ focus is on specific viral infection processes with
assumptions that do not naturally hold for infection processes in other networks. Moreover, there is little work on
determining the sources or index cases of a disease.
On the other hand, the infection source estimation algorithms we consider in this paper can be useful in
applications like pollution source localization, where we are limited to inexpensive sensors capable only of detecting
the presence or absence of a pollutant, and the identities of its neighbors. In this case, spatio-temporal diffusion
models are not applicable as we only have knowledge of which nodes are “infected”. The algorithms we study in
this paper are also applicable to inferring infection sources in viral epidemics, when little information about the
epidemic propagation characteristics is available.
1A function f(n) = O(g(n)) if f(n) ≤ cg(n) for some constant c and for all n sufficiently large.
4B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we consider the estimation of multiple infection sources when the number of infection sources is
unknown a priori. We adopt the same SI diffusion model as in [14], as this has been widely used to model various
infection spreading processes [16]–[21]. The results of this work are applicable to scenarios where the infection
spreads in an approximately homogeneous way, with infections happening independently. Examples include the
spreading of a new disease in a human population, where nobody has yet developed any immunity to the disease.
A novel computer virus attacking a network can also be modeled using a homogeneous spreading process. On the
other hand, our model is highly simplistic and does not model many other spreading processes of practical interest.
However, as alluded to earlier, finding the infection sources in this simple model is already very challenging.
The focus of our work is not on modeling infection processes. Rather, by restricting our analysis to the simplest
homogeneous exponential spreading model, we hope to gain insights into identifying multiple infection sources in
real networks. We show that unlike the single source estimation problem, the multiple source estimation problem is
much more complex and cannot be solved exactly even for regular trees. Our main contributions are the following.
(i) For the case of a tree network, and when it is known that there are two infection sources, we derive an
estimator for the infection sources based on the infection sequences count. The estimator can be calculated
in O(n2) time complexity, where n is the number of infected nodes.
(ii) When there are at most two infection sources that are at least two hops apart, we derive an estimator for
the class of geometric trees based on approximations of the estimator in (i), and we show that our estimator
correctly estimates the number of infection sources and correctly identifies the source nodes, with probability
going to one as the number of infected nodes increases.
(iii) We derive an estimator for the infection regions of every infection source under a simplifying technical
condition.
(iv) For general graphs, when there are at most kmax infection sources, we provide an estimation procedure for
the infection sources and infection regions. Simulations suggest that on average, our estimators are within a
few hops of the true infection sources in the infection graph.2
(v) We test our estimators on real data in Section V-C. The first test is based on real contact tracing data of a
patient cluster during the SARS outbreak in Singapore in 2003. Our estimator correctly identifies the number
of index cases for the cluster to be one and successfully finds this index case. The second test considers the
Arizona-Southern California cascading power outages in 2011. Our estimator correctly identifies the number
of outage sources for the main affected power network to be two, and the distance between our estimators
and the real sources are within 1 hop. These tests suggest that our estimator has reasonable performance in
2In general, we do not know the whole underlying network, but rather the subgraph of infected nodes. For example, in the case of a
contagious disease spreading in a population, we only perform contact tracing on the patients to construct the connections among them. From
our simulation studies, the infection graph typically has an average diameter of more than 27 hops even though the underlying network’s
diameter is much smaller.
5some applications even though we have adopted a simplistic infection model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model and problem formulation.
In Section III, we derive estimators for infection sources and regions for tree networks, and present algorithms to
evaluate them. We also show asymptotic results for geometric tree networks. We discuss estimation algorithms for
general graphs in Section IV. In Section V, we present simulations and tests on real data to verify the performance
of our proposed estimators. Finally we conclude and summarize in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we describe our model and assumptions, introduce some notations, and present some preliminary
results. Consider an undirected graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. If
there is an edge connecting two nodes, we say that they are neighbors. The neighborhood NG(v) of a node v is
the set of all neighbors of v in G. The length of the shortest path between u and v is denoted as d(u, v). In a
computer network, the graph G models the interconnections between computers in the network. In the example of
a population or a social network, V is the set of individuals, while an edge in E represents a relationship between
two individuals. We define an infection to be a property that a node in G possesses, and can be transmitted to
a neighboring node. When a node has an infection, we say that it is infected. The neighbors of an infected node
is said to be susceptible. We assume the susceptible-infected model [15], where once a node has been infected, it
will not lose its infection. We adopt the same infection spreading process as in [14], where the time taken for an
infected node to infect a susceptible neighbor is exponentially distributed with rate 1. All infections are independent
of each other. Therefore, if a susceptible node has more than one infected neighbors and subsequently becomes
infected, its infection is transmitted by one of its infected neighbors, chosen uniformly at random. For mathematical
convenience, we also assume that G is large so that boundary effects can be ignored in our analysis.
Suppose that at time 0, there are k ≥ 1 nodes in the infected node set S∗ = {s1, . . . , sk} ⊂ V . These are the
infection sources from which all other nodes get infected. Suppose that after the infection process has run for some
time, and n nodes are observed to be infected. Typically, n is much larger than k. These nodes form an infection
graph Gn = (Vn, En), which is a subgraph of G. Let A∗n = ∪ki=1An,i be a partition of the infected nodes Vn so
that An,i ∩An,j = ∅ for i 6= j, with each partition An,i being connected in Gn, and consisting of the nodes whose
infection can be traced back to the source node si. The set An,i is called the infection region of si, and we say
that A∗n is the infection partition. Given Gn, our objective is to infer the sources of infection S∗ and to estimate
A∗n. In addition, if we do not have prior knowledge of the number of infection sources k, we also aim to infer
the number of infection sources. Without loss of generality, we assume that Gn is connected, otherwise the same
estimation procedure can be performed on each of the components of the graph. We also assume that there are
at most kmax infection sources, i.e., the number of infection sources k ≤ kmax. From a practical point of view, if
two infection sources are close to each other, we can ignore either one of them and treat the infection as spreading
6from a single source. Therefore, we are interested in cases where the infection sources are separated by a minimum
distance. These assumptions are summarized in the following.
Assumption 1. The number of infection sources is at most kmax, and the infection graph Gn is connected.
Assumption 2. For all si, sj ∈ S∗, the length of the shortest path between them d(si, sj) ≥ τ , where τ is a constant
greater than 1.
Assumption 3. Every node in G has bounded degree, with d∗ being the maximum node degree.
Suppose that our priors for S∗ and A∗n are uniform over all possible realizations, and let P be the probability
measure of the infection process. We seek S and An that maximize the posterior probability of S∗ and A∗n given
Gn,
P(S∗ = S,A∗n = An | Gn) ∝ P (Gn | S)P (An | S,Gn), (1)
where P (Gn | S) is the probability of observing Gn if S is the set of infection sources, and P (An | S,Gn) is the
probability that A∗n = An conditioned on S being the infection source set and the infection graph being Gn.
For any source set S, let an infection sequence σ = (σ1, . . . , σn−k) be a sequence of the nodes in Gn, excluding
the the k source nodes in S, arranged in ascending order of their infection times (note that with probability one,
no two infection times are the same). For any sequence to be an infection sequence, a necessary and sufficient
condition is that any infected node σi, i = 1, . . . , n − k, has a neighbor in S ∪ {σ1, . . . , σi−1}. We call this the
infection sequence property. An example is shown in Figure 1. Let Ω(Gn, S) be the set of infection sequences for
an infection graph Gn and source set S, and let C(S | Gn) = |Ω(Gn, S)| be the number of infection sequences.
We have
P (Gn | S) =
∑
σ∈Ω(Gn,S)
P (σ | S), (2)
where P (σ | S) is the probability of obtaining the infection sequence σ conditioned on S being the infection
sources.
Evaluating the expression (2) and maximizing (1) for a general Gn is a computationally hard problem as it
involves combinatorial quantities. As shown in [14], if G is a regular tree and |S| = 1, P (Gn | S) is proportional
to |Ω(Gn, S)|, which is equivalent to the number of linear extensions of a poset. It is known that evaluating the
linear extensions count is a #P-complete problem [30]. As such, we will make a series of approximations to simplify
the problem, and present numerical results in Section V to verify our algorithms. The first approximation we make
is to evaluate the estimators
Sˆ = arg max
S⊂Vn
|S|≤kmax
P (Gn | S), (3)
Aˆn(Sˆ) = argmax
An
P (An | Sˆ, Gn), (4)
7s1 s2
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Fig. 1. Example of an infection sequence. The shaded nodes are the infected nodes which form the infection graph Gn. Infection sources
are S = {s1, s2}. The sequence (u2, u4) is an infection sequence, but (u4, u2) is not. The probability of the infection sequence σ = (u2, u4)
is then given by P (σ | S) = 2
4
× 1
4
= 1
8
. The first fraction 2
4
is obtained by observing that when only s1 and s2 are infected, there are four
edges (s1, u2), (s1, u3), (s2, u2), and (s2, u5) for the infection to spread. The infection is equally likely to spread along any of these four
edges, out of which two results in the infection of node u2. After u2 is infected, there are 4 edges over which the infection can spread and
this corresponds to the fraction 1
4
.
instead of the exact maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimators for (1). Even with this approximation, the optimal
estimators are difficult to compute exactly, and may not be unique in general. Therefore, our goal is to design algo-
rithms that are approximately optimal but computationally efficient. In Section III, we make further approximations
and design algorithms to evaluate the estimators Sˆ and Aˆn(Sˆ) when G is a tree. In Section IV, we consider the
case when G is a general graph. For the reader’s convenience, we summarize some notations commonly used in
this paper in Table I. Several notations have been introduced previously, while we formally define the remaining
ones in the sequel where they first appear.
III. IDENTIFYING INFECTION SOURCES AND REGIONS FOR TREES
In this section, we consider the problem of estimating the infection sources and regions when the underlying
network G is a tree. We first derive an estimator for the infection partition in (4), given any source node set S and
Gn. Then, we derive an estimator based on the number of infection sequences. Next, we consider the case where
there are two infection sources, propose approximations that allow us to compute the estimator with reasonable
complexity, and show that our proposed estimator works well in an asymptotically large geometric tree under some
simplifying assumptions. In most practical applications, the number of infection sources is not known a priori.
We present a heuristic algorithm for general trees to estimate the infection sources when the number of infection
sources is unknown, but bounded by kmax.
A. Infection Partition with Multiple Sources
In this section, we derive an approximate infection partition estimator for (4) given any infection source set S.
This estimator is exact under a simplifying technical condition given in Theorem 1 below, the proof of which is
provided in Appendix A.
8TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS USED.
Symbol Definition
G underlying network
d(u, v) length of the shortest path between u and v
NG(u) set of neighbors of u in G
degG(u) number of neighbors of node u in G
Gn infection graph with n infected nodes
S∗ infection sources
A∗n infection partition of an infection graph Gn
An,i infection region of an infection source si
Ω(Gn, S)
set of infection sequences for an infection graph Gn
and source set S
C(S | Gn) = |Ω(Gn, S)|
Symbol Definition (defined implicitly w.r.t. Gn)
ρ(u, v) path between u and v in the infection graph Gn
Tv(S) tree in Gn, rooted at v w.r.t. source set S
TM (S) = ∪v∈MTv(S), where M is a subset of nodes
Ii(ξ;S) =
∑
j≤i
|Tξj (S)|, where ξ is a sequence of nodes
I∗i (s1, s2)
total number of nodes in the i biggest trees
in {Tu(s1, s2) : u ∈ ρ(s1, s2)}
Theorem 1. Suppose that G is a tree with infection sources S, and Hn is the subgraph of Gn consisting of all
paths between any pair of nodes in S. If any two paths in Hn do not intersect except possibly at nodes in S, then
the optimal estimator Aˆn(S) for the infection partition is a Voronoi partition of the graph Gn, where the centers
of the partitions are the infection sources S.
A Voronoi partition may not produce the optimal estimator for the infection partition in a general infection graph.
However, it is intuitively appealing as nodes closer to a particular source are more likely to be infected by that
source. For simplicity, we will henceforth use the Voronoi partition of the infection graph Gn as an estimator for
A∗n, and present simulation results in Section V to verify its performance. We will also see in Section III-E that
this approximation allows us to design an infection source estimation algorithm with low complexity.
B. Estimation of Infection Sources
We now consider the problem of estimating the set of infection sources S∗. When |S∗| = 1, our estimation
problem reduces to that in [14], which considers only the single source infection problem. In the following, we
introduce some notations, and briefly review some relevant results from [14].
A path between any two nodes u and v in the tree Gn is denoted as ρ(u, v). For any set of nodes S in Gn,
consider the connected subgraph Hn ⊂ Gn consisting of all paths between any pair of nodes in S. Treat this
9s1 s2u1 um
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n2
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ni+1
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Tn2(S)
Tu1(S) Tρ(u1,um)(S)
Hn
Fig. 2. A sample infection graph with S = {s1, s2}
subgraph as a “super” node, with the tree Gn rooted at this “super” node. For any node v ∈ Gn\Hn, we define
Tv(S) to be the tree rooted at v with the path from v to Hn removed. For v ∈ Hn, we define Tv(S) to be the tree
rooted at v so that all edges between v and its neighbors in Hn are removed.3 We say that Tv(S) is the tree rooted
at v with respect to (w.r.t.) S. For any subset of nodes M ⊂ Gn, we let TM (S) = ∪v∈MTv(S). An illustration
of these definitions is shown in Figure 2. If S = {s1, . . . , sk}, we will sometimes use the notation Tv(s1, . . . , sk)
instead.
Recall that C(S | Gn) is the number of infection sequences if S is the infection source set. If there is a single
infection source node S = {s}, and G is a regular tree where each node has the same degree, it is shown in [14]
that the MAP estimator for the infection source is obtained by evaluating Sˆ = argmaxv∈Gn C(v | Gn), which
seeks to maximize C(v | Gn) over all nodes. Therefore, it has been suggested that C(v | Gn) can be used as the
infection source estimator for general trees. The following result is provided in [14].
Lemma 1. Suppose that Gn is a tree. For any node s ∈ Gn, we have
C(s | Gn) = n!
∏
u∈Gn
|Tu(s)|
−1. (5)
We observe that each term |Tu(s)| in the product on the right hand side (R.H.S.) of (5) is the number of nodes
in the sub-tree Tu(s) (and which appears when we account for the number of permutations of these nodes). We can
think of the terms in the product being ordered according to the infection spreading sequence, i.e., each time we
reach a particular node u, we include terms corresponding to the nodes u can potentially infect. This interpretation
is useful in helping us understand the characterization in Lemma 2 for the case where there are two infection
sources.
To compute C(v | Gn), an O(n) algorithm based on Lemma 1 was provided in [14]. We call this algorithm the
Single Source Estimation (SSE) algorithm. We refer the reader to [14] for details about the implementation of the
algorithm. Although finding Sˆ by maximizing C(s | Gn) is exact only for regular trees, it was shown in [14] that
this estimator has good performance for other classes of trees. In particular, if G is a geometric tree (cf. Section
III-D), then the probability, conditioned on S∗ = {s}, of correctly identifying s using C(s | Gn) goes to one as
3As Tv(S) is defined on Gn, its notation should include Gn. However, in order to avoid cluttered expressions, we drop Gn in our
notations. Confusion will be avoided through the context in which these trees are referenced.
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Fig. 3. A sample infection graph with S = {s1, s2}. Given an infection sequence σ = (u3, u1, u2) ∈ Ω(ρ(s1, s2), {s1, s2}), we
can find the corresponding reverse infection sequence ξ = (u2, u1, u3). We have I1(ξ; s1, s2) = |Tu2(s1, s2)| = 1, I2(ξ; s1, s2) =
|Tu2(s1, s2)|+ |Tu1(s1, s2)| = 4, I3(ξ; s1, s2) = |Tu2(s1, s2)|+ |Tu1(s1, s2)|+ |Tu3(s1, s2)| = 6.
n → ∞. Inspired by this result, we propose estimators based on quantities related to C(S | Gn) for cases where
|S∗| > 1. In the following, we first discuss the case where |S∗| = 2, and extend the results to the general case
where |S∗| is unknown in Section III-E. We then numerically compare our proposed algorithms with a modified
SSE algorithm adapted for finding multiple sources in Section V.
C. Two Infection Sources
In this section, we assume that there are two infection sources S = {s1, s2}. Given two nodes u and v in Gn,
suppose that |ρ(u, v)| = m. For any permutation ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξm) of the nodes in ρ(u, v), let
Ii(ξ; s1, s2) =
∑
j≤i
|Tξj (s1, s2)| (6)
be the total number of nodes in the trees rooted at the first i nodes in the permutation ξ. We have the following
characterization for C(s1, s2 | Gn), whose proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. Suppose that Gn is a tree. Consider any two nodes s1 and s2 in Gn, and suppose that ρ(s1, s2) =
(s1, u1, . . . , um, s2). We have
C(s1, s2 | Gn) = (n− 2)! · q(u1, um; s1, s2) ·
∏
u∈Gn\ρ(s1,s2)
|Tu(s1, s2)|
−1, (7)
where for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ m, q(ui, uj ; s1, s2) satisfies the following recursive relationship
q(ui, uj ; s1, s2) = |Tρ(ui,uj)(s1, s2)|
−1 (q(ui+1, uj ; s1, s2) + q(ui, uj−1; s1, s2)) for i < j, (8)
with q(v, v; s1, s2) = |Tv(s1, s2)|−1 for all v ∈ ρ(u1, um). Furthermore, we have
q(u1, um; s1, s2) =
∑
ξ∈Γ(u1,um)
m∏
i=1
Ii(ξ; s1, s2)
−1, (9)
and Γ(u1, um) is the set of all permutations ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξm) of nodes in ρ(u1, um) such that (ξm, . . . , ξ1) is an
infection sequence starting from s1 and s2 and resulting in ρ(s1, s2).
The characterization for C(s1, s2 | Gn) is similar to that for the single source case in (5), except for the additional
q(u1, um; s1, s2) term. We first clarify the meaning of Γ(u1, um). Given any infection sequence σ that starts with
{s1, s2} and results in ρ(s1, s2), i.e., σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ Ω(ρ(s1, s2), {s1, s2}), we can find a permutation ξ =
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(ξ1, . . . , ξm) of nodes in ρ(u1, um) such that ξi = σm−i+1 for i = 1, . . . ,m. In other words, ξ can be interpreted as
the reverse infection sequence corresponding to σ. Then Γ(u1, um) is the set of all such reverse infection sequences
corresponding to Ω(ρ(s1, s2), {s1, s2}). We show an illustration of these definitions in Figure 3. Each term |Tu(s)|
in the product in the R.H.S. of (5) can be interpreted as the number of nodes that can be infected via u once
u has been infected. Similarly, the sum in (9) is over all possible reverse infection sequences ξ of the nodes in
ρ(u1, um), and each term Ii(ξ; s1, s2) in the product within the sum is the number of nodes that can be infected
once ξi+1, . . . , ξm have been infected.
By utilizing Lemma 2, we can compute C(u, v | Gn) for any two nodes u and v in Gn by evaluating |Tw(u, v)|
for all nodes w ∈ Gn, and the quantity q(u1, um;u, v), where ρ(u, v) = (u, u1, . . . , um, v). With Assumption 3,
Algorithm 1 allows us to compute fw(u) = |Tw(u)| and gw(u) =
∏
v∈Tw(u)
|Tv(u)| for all neighbors u of w, and
for all w ∈ Gn in O(n) time complexity. To do this, we first choose any node r ∈ Gn, and consider Gn as a
directed tree with r as the root node, and with edges in Gn pointing away from r. Let pa(w) and ch(w) be the
parent and the set of children of w in the directed tree Gn, respectively. Starting from the leaf nodes, let each
non-root node w ∈ Gn pass two messages containing fw(pa(w)) and gw(pa(w)) to its parent. Each node stores the
values of these two messages from each of its children, and computes its two messages to be passed to its parent.
When r has received all messages from its children, a reverse sweep down the tree is done so that at the end of
the algorithm, every node w ∈ Gn has stored the values {fu(w), gu(w) : u ∈ NGn(w)}. The algorithm is formally
described in Algorithm 1. The last product term on the R.H.S. of (7) can then be computed using
g(s1, s2) =
∏
w∈ρ(s1,s2)
∏
x∈NGn(w)\ρ(s1,s2)
gx(w), (10)
and taking its reciprocal.
To compute C(s1, s2 | Gn) in (7), we still need to compute q(u1, um; s1, s2). The recurrence (8) allows us to
compute q(u1, um; s1, s2) for all s1, s2 ∈ Gn in O(n2d2∗) complexity, where d∗ is the maximum node degree. The
computation proceeds by first considering each pair of neighbors (u, v). Both nodes have at most d∗ neighbors
each, so that we need to evaluate q(u, v; s1, s2) for all s1 ∈ NGn(u)\ρ(u, v) and s2 ∈ NGn(v)\ρ(u, v). This
requires O(d2∗) computations. The computed values and Tρ(u,v)(s1, s2) are stored in a hash table. In the next step,
we repeat the same procedure for node pairs that are two hops apart, and so on until we have considered every pair
of nodes in Gn. Note that for a path (u1, . . . , um) and s1, s2 neighbors of u1 and um respectively, q(u1, um; s1, s2)
can be computed in constant time from (8) as q(u2, um; s1, s2) = q(u2, um;u1, s2) and q(u1, um−1; s1, s2) =
q(u1, um−1; s1, um). A similar remark applies for the computation of |Tρ(u1,um)(s1, s2)|. In addition, each lookup
of the hash table takes O(1) complexity since Gn is known and collision-free hashing can be used. Therefore,
the overall complexity is O(n2d2∗). The algorithm to compute the infection sources estimator is formally given in
Algorithm 2. We call this the Two Source Estimation (TSE) algorithm, and it forms the basis of our algorithm for
multiple sources estimation in the sequel.
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Algorithm 1 Tree Sizes and Products Computation
1: Inputs: Gn
2: Choose any node r ∈ Gn as the root node.
3: for w ∈ Gn do
4: Store received messages fx(w) and gx(w), for each x ∈ ch(w).
5: if w is a leaf then
6: fw(pa(w)) = 1
7: gw(pa(w)) = 1
8: else
9: fw(pa(w)) =
∑
x∈ch(w) fx(w) + 1
10: gw(pa(w)) = fw(pa(w)) ·
∏
x∈ch(w) gx(w)
11: end if
12: Store fpa(w)(w) = n− fw(pa(w)).
13: Pass fw(pa(w)) and gw(pa(w)) to pa(w).
14: end for
15: Set gpa(r)(r) = 1.
16: for w ∈ Gn do
17: Store received message gpa(w)(w) from pa(w).
18: if w is not a leaf then
19: for x ∈ ch(w) do
20: gw(x) = fw(x) · gpa(w)(w) ·
∏
y∈ch(w)\{x} gy(w)
21: Pass gw(x) to x.
22: end for
23: end if
24: end for
D. Geometric Trees with Two Sources
In this section, we study the special case of geometric trees, propose an approximate estimator for geometric
trees, and provide theoretical analysis for its performance. First, we give the definition of geometric trees and prove
some of its key properties. Then, we derive a lower bound for C(S | Gn), and propose an estimator based on this
lower bound. We show that our proposed estimator is asymptotically correct, i.e., it identifies the actual infection
sources with probability (conditioned on the infection sources) going to one as the infection graph Gn becomes
large. For mathematical convenience, instead of letting the number of infected nodes n grow large, we let the time
t from the start of the infection process to our observation time become large.
The geometric tree network is defined in [14] w.r.t. a single infection source. In the following, we extend this
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Algorithm 2 Two Source Estimation (TSE)
1: Input: Gn
2: Let (s∗1, s∗2) be the maximizer of C(·, · | Gn). Set C∗ = 0.
3: for d = 1 to diameter of Gn do
4: for each s1 ∈ Gn do
5: for each s2 such that d(s1, s2) = d do
6: Let ρ(s1, s2) = (s1, u1, . . . , ud−1, s2).
7: if d = 1 then
8: q(u1, ud−1; s1, s2) = 1.
9: else if d = 2 then
10: Store q(u1, u1; s1, s2) = |Tu1(s1, s2)|−1 and |Tu1(s1, s2)|.
11: else
12: Look up |Tρ(u1,ud−2)(s1, ud−1)|, q(u2, ud−1;u1, s2), and q(u1, ud−2; s1, ud−1).
13: Store
|Tρ(u1,ud−1)(s1, s2)| = |Tρ(u1,ud−2)(s1, ud−1)| · |Tud−1(s1, s2)|.
14: Store
q(u1, ud−1; s1, s2) =
q(u2, ud−1;u1, s2) + q(u1, ud−2; s1, ud−1)
|Tρ(u1,ud−1)(s1, s2)|
.
15: end if
16: Compute g(s1, s2) from (10).
17: C(s1, s2 | Gn) = (n− 2)!q(u1, ud−1; s1, s2)/g(s1, s2).
18: Update (s∗1, s∗2) and C∗ if C(s1, s2 | Gn) > C∗.
19: end for
20: end for
21: end for
definition to the case where there are two sources. Let S∗ = {s1, s2} be the infection sources, and let T ′u(s1, s2)
be defined in the graph G in the same way as Tu(s1, s2) is defined for Gn. Let NG(ρ(s1, s2)) be the set of nodes
that have a neighboring node in ρ(s1, s2). For each node u, let n(u, r) be the number of nodes in T ′u(s1, s2) that
are at a distance r from u. We say that G is a geometric tree if for all u ∈ N (ρ(s1, s2)), we have
brα ≤ n(u, r) ≤ crα, (11)
where α, b, and c are fixed positive constants with b ≤ c. The condition (11) implies that all trees defined w.r.t.
the infection sources are growing polynomially fast at about the same rate. As we have assumed that the infection
14
s1 s2u1 umx1 x2
Fig. 4. Addition of virtual nodes x1 and x2.
rates are homogeneous for every node, the resulting infection graph Gn will also be approximately regular with
high probability. We have the following properties for a geometric tree, whose proofs are in Appendix C.
Lemma 3. Suppose that G is a geometric tree with two infection sources S∗ = {s1, s2}. Let α, b and c be fixed
positive constants satisfying (11) for the geometric tree G. Let t be the time from the start of the infection process
to our observation time. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), let Et be the event that all nodes within distance t(1 − t−1/2+ǫ) of
either source nodes are infected, and no nodes greater than distance t(1 + t−1/2+ǫ) of either source nodes are
infected. Then, there exists t0 such that for all t ≥ t0, P(Et) ≥ 1− ǫ. Furthermore, conditioned on Et, we have for
all u ∈ NG(s1) ∪ NG(s2) or u = ρ(s1, s2)\S∗,
Nmin(t) ≤ |Tu(s1, s2)| ≤ Nmax(t), (12)
where
Nmin(t) =
b
1 + α
(
t− t
1
2
+ǫ − d(s1, s2)− 2
)α+1
, (13)
and
Nmax(t) =
c
1 + α
(
t+ t
1
2
+ǫ
)α+1
. (14)
In addition, for t ≥ t0, we have
Nmin(t)
Nmax(t)
≥
b
c
(1− ǫ).
The infection sequences count in (7) is not amendable to analysis. In the following, we seek an approximation to
simplify our analysis. For s1, s2 ∈ Gn, suppose that ρ(s1, s2) = (s1, u1, . . . , um, s2), with p = |ρ(s1, s2)| = m+2.
Instead of computing C(s1, s2 | Gn), we consider a new infection graph G′n with two “virtual” nodes xi, i = 1, 2
added, where xi is attached to si (see Figure 4). We now consider the infection sequence count C(x1, x2 | G′n) ≥
C(s1, s2 | Gn). Since the trees rooted at xi are single node trees, we have
C(x1, x2 | G
′
n) = C(s1, x2 | G
′
n) + C(x1, s2 | G
′
n)
≤ 2(n− 1)C(s1, s2 | Gn),
where the last inequality follows because if s1 and x2 are sources, then s2 can be inserted in any of at most n− 1
positions in an infection sequence from Ω(Gn, {s1, s2}), so that C(s1, x2 | G′n) ≤ (n−1)C(s1, s2 | Gn). A similar
argument holds for C(x1, s2 | G′n) ≤ (n− 1)C(s1, s2 | Gn).
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Let ξ∗ = (ξ∗1 , . . . , ξ∗p) be a permutation of the nodes in ρ(s1, s2) such that |Tξ∗i (s1, s2)| ≥ |Tξ∗j (s1, s2)| for all
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ p, i.e., the nodes in ξ∗ are arranged in descending order of the size of the sub-trees rooted at them.
Let I∗i (s1, s2) = Ii(ξ∗; s1, s2) (cf. the definition in (6)) be the total number of nodes in the i biggest sub-trees in
{Tu(s1, s2) : u ∈ ρ(s1, s2)}. From Lemma 2, we have
C(x1, x2 | G
′
n) ≥ n! · 2
p−1
p∏
i=1
I∗i (s1, s2)
−1
∏
u∈Gn\ρ(s1,s2)
|Tu(s1, s2)|
−1, (15)
where the inequality holds because |Γ(s1, s2)| = 2p−1, and each term in the sum on the R.H.S. of (9) is lower
bounded by
∏p
i=1 I
∗
i (s1, s2)
−1
. We use the lower bound in (15) as a proxy for C(s1, s2 | Gn). However, we have
used a very loose lower bound in (15), so we propose the estimator
S˜ = arg max
s1,s2∈Gn
C˜(s1, s2 | Gn), (16)
where
C˜(s1, s2 | Gn) = n! ·Q(s1, s2)
∏
u∈Gn\ρ(s1,s2)
|Tu(s1, s2)|
−1, (17)
Q(s1, s2) = [2(1 + δ)]
p−1
p∏
i=1
I∗i (s1, s2)
−1,
and δ is a fixed positive constant, to be chosen based on prior knowledge about the graph G. Algorithm 2 can be
modified to find the maximizer for C˜(·, · | Gn). We call this the geometric tree TSE algorithm. The following result
provides a way to choose δ, and shows that our proposed estimator S˜ is asymptotically correct in a geometric tree.
A proof is provided in Appendix D.
Theorem 2. Suppose that G is a geometric tree with two infection sources S∗ = {s∗1, s∗2}. Let dmin and dmax be
constants such that degG(si) ∈ [dmin, dmax] for i = 1, 2. Let b and c be fixed positive constants satisfying (11) for
the geometric tree G. Suppose that
dmin ≥
3
2
+
c
b
√
2dmax. (18)
Then, for any δ in the non-empty interval(
cdmax
b(dmin − 1)
− 1,
b(dmin − 2)
2c
− 1
)
, (19)
we have
lim
t→∞
P(S˜ = S∗ | S∗) = 1.
Theorem 2 implies that if we know the constants governing the regularity condition (11) for G, we can choose a δ
so that our estimator S˜ gives the true infection sources with high probability if the infection graph Gn is large. The
class of geometric trees as defined by (11) can be used to model various scenarios in practice, e.g., a tree spanning
a wireless sensor network with nodes randomly scattered. However, the assumption (11) may also be overly strong
for other applications. In Section V, we perform numerical studies to gain insights into the performance of our
proposed estimator for different classes of tree networks.
16
E. Unknown Number of Infection Sources
In most practical applications, the number of infection sources is not known a priori. However, typically we may
be able to guess the maximum number of infection sources kmax, or we can choose a reasonable value of kmax
depending on the size of the infection graph Gn. In this section, we present a heuristic algorithm that allows us to
estimate the infection sources with a given kmax.
We first consider the instructive case where kmax = 2 and G is a geometric tree. In this case, the number of
infection sources can be either one or two. Suppose we run the geometric tree TSE algorithm on Gn. We have the
following result, whose proof is in Appendix E.
Theorem 3. Suppose that there is a single infection source s and G is a geometric tree with (11) holding for all
nodes u that are neighbors of s. Suppose that s has degree degG(s) ∈ [dmin, dmax], where dmin and dmax are
positive constants satisfying (18). Then, for any δ in the interval (19), the geometric tree TSE algorithm estimates
as sources s and one of its neighbors with probability (conditioned on s being the infection source) going to 1 as
t→∞.
Theorem 3 implies that when there exists only one source, the geometric tree TSE algorithm finds two neighboring
nodes, one of which is the true source. From Theorem 2 and Assumption 2, if there are two sources, our algorithm
identifies the two source nodes, which are at least two hops from each other, with high probability. Therefore, by
checking the distance between the two nodes identified by the geometric tree TSE algorithm, we can estimate the
number of source nodes in the infection graph. This observation together with Theorem 1 suggest the following
heuristic.
(i) Randomly choose kmax nodes satisfying Assumption 2 as the infection sources and find a Voronoi partition
for Gn. Use the SSE algorithm to find a source node for each infection region. Repeat these steps until for
every region, the distance between estimated source nodes between iterations is below a fixed threshold or a
maximum number of iterations is reached. We call this the Infection Partition (IP) Algorithm (see Algorithm
3).
(ii) For any two regions in the partition obtained from step (i) that are connected by an edge in Gn, run the TSE
algorithm in the combined region to find two source estimates. If the two estimates have distance less than
τ , we decrement the number of source nodes, and repeat step (i).
(iii) The above two steps are repeated until no two pairs of regions in the Voronoi partition can be combined. The
formal algorithm is given as the Multiple Sources Estimation and Partitioning (MSEP) algorithm in Algorithm
4.
To compute the complexity of the MSEP algorithm, we note that since the IP algorithm is based on the SSE
algorithm, it has complexity O(n). For each value of k = 1, . . . , kmax in the MSEP algorithm, there are O(k2)
pairs of neighboring regions in the infection partition. For each pair of region, the TSE algorithm makes O(n2)
computations. Summing over all k = 1, . . . , kmax, the time complexity of the MSEP algorithm can be shown to be
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Algorithm 3 Infection Partitioning (IP)
1: Inputs: An infection source set S(0) = {s(0)i : i = 1, . . . ,m} in Gn.
2: Iterations:
3: for l = 1 to MaxIter do
4: Run the Voronoi partitioning algorithm with centers in S(l−1) to obtain the infection partition A(l) = ∪mi=1A
(l)
i .
5: for i = 1 to m do
6: Run SSE algorithm in A(l)i to obtain
s
(l)
i = arg max
s∈A(l)i
C(s | A
(l)
i ).
7: end for
8: S(l) := {s(l)i : i = 1, . . . ,m}
9: if max1≤i≤m d(s(l)i , s
(l−1)
i ) ≤ η for some fixed small positive η then
10: break
11: end if
12: end for
13: return (S(l),A(l))
O(k3maxn
2). On the other hand, to compute C(S | Gn) for |S∗| = kmax would require O(nkmax) computations.
IV. IDENTIFYING INFECTION SOURCES AND REGIONS FOR GENERAL GRAPHS
In this section, we generalize the MSEP algorithm to identify multiple infection sources in general graphs G.
In [14], the SSE algorithm is extended to general graphs when it is known that there is only a single infection
source in the network using a heuristic. The algorithm first chooses a node s of Gn as the root node, and generates
a spanning tree Tbfs(s,Gn) of Gn rooted at s using the breadth-first-search (BFS) procedure. The SSE algorithm
is then applied on this spanning tree to compute C(s | Tbfs(s,Gn)). In addition, the infection sequences count is
weighted by the likelihood of the BFS tree. This is repeated using every node in Gn as the root node, and the node
sˆ with the maximum weighted infection sequences count is chosen as the source estimator, i.e.,
sˆ = arg max
v∈Gn
P (σv | v)C(s | Tbfs(v,Gn)),
where σv is the sequence of nodes that corresponds to an infection spreading from v along the BFS tree. It can
be shown that this algorithm has complexity O(n2). For further details, the reader is referred to [14]. We call this
algorithm the SSE-BFS algorithm in this paper.
We adapt the MSEP algorithm for general graphs using the same BFS heuristic. Specifically, we replace the
SSE algorithm in line 6 of the IP algorihm with the SSE-BFS algorithm. In addition, in line 9, we run the TSE
algorithm on Tbfs(si, Ai) ∪ Tbfs(sj , Aj), where the two BFS trees are connected by randomly selecting an edge
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Algorithm 4 Multiple Sources Estimation and Partitioning (MSEP)
1: Inputs: Gn and kmax.
2: Initialization:
3: k := kmax and choose S := {s1, . . . , sk} randomly in Gn.
4: Iterations:
5: while k > 1 do
6: (S,A) = Algorithm IP(S)
7: S′ := S
8: for all regions Ai and Aj in the partition A such that there exists an edge (u, v) in Gn with u ∈ Ai and
v ∈ Aj do
9: Set (u, v) = Algorithm TSE(Ai ∪Aj).
10: if d(u, v) < τ then
11: Merge Ai and Aj , set si = u and discard sj
12: k := k − 1
13: break
14: end if
15: end for
16: if S = S′ then
17: break
18: end if
19: end while
20: return (S,A)
(u, v) in Gn with u ∈ Tbfs(si, Ai) and v ∈ Tbfs(sj, Aj). We call this modified algorithm the MSEP-BFS algorithm.
Since the worst case complexity for the SSE-BFS algorithm is O(n2), the complexity of the MSEP-BFS algorithm
can be shown to be O(k3maxn2), which is the same complexity as the MSEP algorithm. To verify the effectiveness
of the MSEP-BFS algorithm, we conduct simulations on both synthetic and real world networks in Section V.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND TESTS
In this section, we present results from simulations and tests on real data to verify our proposed algorithms. We
first consider geometric tree networks and regular tree networks with various numbers of infection sources, and then
we present results on small-world networks and a real world power grid network. We also apply our algorithms
to the contact tracing data obtained during the SARS outbreak in Singapore in 2003 [1] and the Arizona-Southern
California cascading power outages in 2011 [31].
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Fig. 5. Estimating the number of infection source nodes.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE COMPARIONS.
Simulation settings Average Average error distance ∆ Average minimum
network topology |S∗|
diameter MSEP/MSEP-BFS nSSE infection region
of Gn η = 0 η = diameter η = 0 η = diameter known |S∗| covering percentage (%)
geometric trees
2 63.7 0.61 1.72 9.65 30.16 12.85 97.06
3 66.2 0.91 2.42 7.69 29.95 14.84 89.77
regular trees
2 40.5 0.84 6.07 4.50 17.70 6.13 73.82
3 43.7 0.94 6.24 3.39 17.47 6.59 65.95
small-world networks
2 35.5 2.95 8.19 5.40 17.13 8.28 76.62
3 40.9 2.58 8.18 4.99 18.56 10.37 60.69
power grid network
2 27.3 3.65 7.39 5.50 14.66 7.89 70.29
3 30.8 2.85 8.47 4.71 14.75 8.89 59.95
A. Synthetic Networks
We perform simulations on geometric trees, regular trees, and small-world networks. The number of infection
sources |S∗| are chosen to be 1, 2, or 3, and we set kmax = 3. For each type of network and each number of
infection sources, we perform 1000 simulation runs with 500 infected nodes. We randomly choose infection sources
satisfying Assumption 2 and obtain the infection graph by simulating the infection spreading process using the SIR
model. Finally, the MSEP or MSEP-BFS algorithm for tree networks and small-world networks respectively, is
applied to the infection graph to estimate the number and locations of the infection sources. The estimation results
for the number of infection sources |Sˆ| in different scenarios are shown in Figure 5. It can be seen that our algorithm
correctly finds the number of infection sources more than 93% of the time for geometric trees, and more than 71%
of the time for regular trees. The accuracy of about 69.2% for small-world networks is worse than that for the
tree networks, as the infection tree for a small-world network has to be estimated using the BFS heuristics, thus
additional errors are introduced into the procedure.
When there are more than one infection sources, we compare the performance of the MSEP algorithm with a
naive estimator based on the SSE algorithm. We call this the nSSE algorithm. Specifically, in the estimator for tree
networks, we first compute C(u | Gn) for all nodes u ∈ Gn, and choose the |S∗| nodes with the largest counts as
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the source nodes. In non-tree networks, we use the SSE-BFS algorithm. Since the nSSE algorithm can not estimate
|S∗|, we consider two variants. In the first variant, we assume the nSSE algorithm has prior knowledge of |S∗|. In
the second variant, we guess |S∗| by choosing uniformly from {1, . . . , kmax}.
To quantify the performance of each algorithm, we first match the estimated source nodes Sˆ = {sˆi : i =
1, . . . , |Sˆ|} with the actual sources S∗ so that the sum of the error distances between each estimated source and
its match is minimized. Let this matching be denoted by the function π, which matches each actual source si to
sˆπ(i). If we have incorrectly estimated the number of infection sources, i.e., |Sˆ| 6= |S∗|, we add a penalty term to
this sum. The average error distance is then given by
∆ =
1
|S∗|

min(|S
∗|,|Sˆ|)∑
i=1
d(sˆπ(i), si) + η
∣∣∣|Sˆ| − |S∗|∣∣∣

 ,
where η is a penalty weight for incorrectly estimating the number of infection sources. For different applications,
we may assign different values to η depending on how important it is to estimate correctly the number of infection
sources. In our simulations, we consider the cases where η = 0, and where η is the diameter of the infection graph.
The average error distances for the different types of networks are provided in Table II. Clearly, the MSEP/MSEP-
BFS algorithm outperforms the nSSE algorithm, even when the nSSE algorithm has prior knowledge of the number
of sources. When |S∗| is known a priori, the performance of the nSSE algorithm deteriorates with increasing |S∗|.
This is to be expected as the SSE algorithm assumes that the node with the largest infection sequence count is the
only source, and this node tends to be close to the distance center [32] of the infection graph. The histogram of
the average error distances when η = 0 are shown in Figure 6.
The MSEP/MSEP-BFS algorithm also estimates the infection region of each source. To evaluate its accuracy, we
first perform the matching process described previously. Let the true infection region of si be An,i and the estimated
infection region of sˆπ(i) be Aˆn,i, where we set Aˆn,i = ∅, if we have underestimated the number of sources and si
is unmatched. We define the correct infection region covering percentage for si as the ratio between |Aˆn,i ∩An,i|
and |An,i|, and we compute the minimum (or worst case) infection region covering percentage as
min
i∈{1,··· ,|S∗|}
|Aˆn,i ∩An,i|
|An,i|
.
This is then averaged over all simulation runs. We find that the average minimum infection region covering
percentage is more than 59% for all networks, as shown in Table II.
B. Real World Networks
We verify the performance of the MSEP-BFS algorithm on the western states power grid network of the United
States [33]. We simulate the infection spreading process on the power grid network, which contains 4941 nodes.
For each simulation run, 1, 2 or 3 infection sources are randomly chosen from the power grid network under
Assumption 2, and the spreading process is simulated so that a total of 500 nodes are infected. For each value of
|S∗|, 1000 simulation runs are performed. The simulation results are shown in Figures 5 and 6(d), and Table II.
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(a) Geometric trees.
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(b) Regular trees.
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(c) Small-world networks.
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(d) US power grid network.
Fig. 6. Histogram of the average error distances for various networks. We assume η = 0 and that the nSSE algorithm has prior knowledge
of the number of infection sources.
We see that the MSEP-BFS algorithm outperforms the nSSE algorithm in every scenario. The average infection
region covering percentage is above 59%.
C. Tests on Real Data
In order to get some insights in the performance of the MSEP-BFS algorithm in real infection spreads, we
conduct two tests on real infection spreads data. We first apply the MSEP-BFS algorithm to to a network of nodes
that represent the individuals who were infected with the SARS virus during an epidemic in Singapore in the year
2003. The data is collected using contact tracing of patients [1], where an edge between two nodes indicate that
there is some form of interaction or relationship between the individuals (e.g., they are family members, classmates,
colleagues, or commuters who shared the same public transport system). A part of the SARS infection network
corresponding to a cluster of 193 patients is shown in Figure 7. We test the MSEP-BFS algorithm on the network
in Figure 7, assuming that there are at most kmax = 3 infection sources. It turns out that the MSEP-BFS algorithm
correctly estimates the number of infection sources to be one, and correctly identifies the real infection source.
We next consider the Arizona-Southern California cascading power outages in 2011 [31]. The affected power
network is represented by a graph where a node represents a key facility (substation or generating plant) affected by
an outage, and an edge between two nodes indicate that there is a transmission line between these two facilities. The
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Fig. 7. Illustration of a cluster of the SARS infection network with a single source.
cascading outage starts with the loss of a single transmission line. However, as indicated in [31], this transmission
line alone would not cause a cascading outage. After the loss of this transmission line, instantaneous power flow
redistributions led to large voltage deviations, resulting in the nuclear units at San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station being taken off the power grid. The failures of these two key facilities together serve as the main causes
of the subsequent cascading outages, so these two facilities are considered as the two infection sources. The main
affected power network containing 48 facilities is shown in Figure 8. We test the MSEP-BFS algorithm on the
network in Figure 8, and assume that there are at most kmax = 3 infection sources. We can see that the MSEP-BFS
algorithm correctly estimates the number of infection sources to be two. We also found one of the sources correctly,
and one estimate 1 hop away from the real source.
Fig. 8. Illustration of the main affected power network with two infection sources.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have derived estimators for the infection sources and regions when the number of infection sources is bounded
but unknown a priori. The estimators are based only on knowledge of the infected nodes and their underlying
network connections. We provide an approximation for the infection source estimator for the class of geometric
trees, and when there are at most two sources in the network. We show that this estimator asymptotically correctly
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identifies the infection sources when the number of infected nodes grows large. We also propose an algorithm that
estimates the number of source nodes, and identify them and their respective infection regions for general infection
graphs. Simulation results on geometric trees, regular trees, small-world networks, the US power grid network, and
experimental results on the SARS infection network and cascading power outages show that our proposed estimation
procedure performs well in general, with an average error distance of less than 4. The estimation accuracy of the
number of source nodes is over 65% in all the networks we consider, with the geometric tree networks having an
accuracy of over 90%. Furthermore, the minimum infection region covering percentage is more than 59% for all
networks. Our estimation procedure assumes only knowledge of the underlying network connections. In practical
applications where more information about the infection process is available, a more accurate and intelligent guess
of the number of infection sources can be made.
In this paper, we have adopted a simple SI infection model with homogeneous spreading rates, allowing us
to derive analytical results that provide useful insights into infection source estimation for practical networks.
However, this simplistic diffusion model does not adequately capture the real world dynamics of many networks.
Future research includes the use of richer diffusion models that allow the inclusion of drifts and other dynamics
in the infection spreading process, and tools from statistics to approximate optimal estimators for the infection
sources. Our proposed algorithms find a set of nodes most likely to infect or influence a network, and are thus
potentially useful for various practical applications. For example, our algorithm may be integrated with non-model-
based consensus methods [34], [35] to design multi-agent control systems that uses only a small subset of agents as
controllers. In cloud-centric media platforms [36], variants of our proposed algorithm may be used for intelligent
content cache management. These are all areas of future research.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let nodes that are infected by source si be colored with color i, with i = 1, . . . , k. Then a partition An corresponds
to a coloring of the graph Hn, and to quantify the probability of a partition, it is sufficient to consider only infection
sequences in the graph Hn. We have
P (An | S,Gn) =
∑
σ∈Ω(Hn,S,An)
P (σ | S), (20)
where
Ω(Hn, S,An) = {σ ∈ Ω(Hn, S) : σ ∩An,i is an infection sequence, for all i = 1, . . . , k.},
and σ ∩An,i is the subsequence of σ containing only nodes that are in An,i.
Let h = |Hn| − k, and consider an infection sequence σ = (σ1, . . . , σh) ∈ Ω(Hn, S,An). Let the set of edges
connecting susceptible nodes to infected nodes be called the susceptible edge set. We have assumed that the infection
times of susceptible nodes are independent and identically exponentially distributed. Therefore, given the infection
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sequence σ1, . . . , σl−1, the next edge along which the infection is spread is chosen uniformly at random from the
susceptible edge set at time index l− 1. Since Hn is a tree where all nodes except those in S have degree 2, after
infection of a new node, the susceptible edge set size remains the same except in the case where the infected node is
the last node to be infected amongst those on a path connecting two infection sources. In that case, the susceptible
edge set size reduces by 2. Let Jσ be the set of indices of the last infected nodes on every path connecting infection
sources. Letting nl = 1 if l /∈ Jσ and 2 otherwise, we then have
P (σ | S) =
h∏
l=1
nlpl(σ | Hn, S)
= 2p
h∏
l=1
pl(σ | Hn, S) (21)
where p is the number of paths connecting infection sources, and
pl(σ | Hn, S) =

∑
s∈S
degHn(s)− 2
∑
j∈Jσ
1{j<l}


−1
. (22)
Choose two sources si and sj and let m be the number of nodes in the path ρ(si, sj) connecting si and sj ,
excluding the source nodes. Suppose that r > ⌈m/2⌉ nodes in this path have color i. Construct a new coloring A′n
so that ⌈m/2⌉ nodes in ρ(si, sj) closest to si have color i and the rest have color j. The rest of the nodes in A′n
have the same colors as that in An. Each infection sequence σ ∈ Ω(Hn, S,An) corresponds to an infection
sequence σ′ ∈ Ω(Hn, S,A′n), where the last x = r − ⌈m/2⌉ color-i nodes in σ become the last x color-j
nodes in σ′. From (22), we have pl(σ | Hn, S) = pl(σ′ | Hn, S) for all l. Since
( m
⌈m/2⌉
)
≥
(m
r
)
, we have
|Ω(Hn, S,A
′
n)| ≥ |Ω(Hn, S,An)|, therefore (20) yields P (A′n | S,Gn) ≥ P (An | S,Gn).
The same argument can be repeated a finite number of times for all paths in Hn connecting infection sources.
This shows that the estimator Aˆn(S) is a Voronoi partition of Gn, and the proof is complete.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To simplify notations, we write Tu(s1, s2) as Tu, with the implicit understanding that all trees are defined w.r.t.
{s1, s2}. The number of infection sequences can be found by counting the number of ways to form such a sequence.
The n− 2 slots in a sequence are occupied by nodes from Tsi\{si}, i = 1, 2, and Tρ(u1,um). Therefore, we have
C(s1, s2 | Gn) = (n− 2)!
2∏
i=1
C(si | Tsi)
(|Tsi | − 1)!
·
R(u1, um)
|Tρ(u1,um)|!
=
(n− 2)!
|Tρ(u1,um)|!
·R(u1, um) ·
∏
v∈Tsi ,i=1,2
v 6=s1,s2
|Tv|
−1,
where R(ui, uj) for i ≤ j is the number of ways of permuting the nodes in Tρ(ui,uj) such that the infection sequence
property is maintained, and the last equality follows from Lemma 1. To simplify the notations, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ m,
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let
J(ui, uj) =
∏
v∈Tρ(ui,uj)\ρ(ui,uj)
|Tv |
−1.
For example, from Lemma 1, we have C(ui | Tui) = (|Tui | − 1)!J(ui, ui). In the following, we show that for
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ m,
R(ui, uj) = |Tρ(ui,uj)|! · q(ui, uj ; s1, s2) · J(ui, uj). (23)
The proof proceeds by induction on j − i. If j = i, we have R(ui, ui) = C(ui | Tui) and the claim follows from
Lemma 1. Suppose that the claim (23) holds for all nodes uk and up such that p − k < j − i. The number of
permutations R(ui, ui) can be computed by considering a sequence with m = |Tρ(ui,uj)| slots. The first slot can
be filled with either ui or uj . Therefore, we have
R(ui, uj) = (m− 1)!
(
C(ui | Tui)
(|Tui | − 1)!
R(ui+1, uj)
|Tρ(ui+1,uj)|!
+
C(uj | Tuj )
(|Tuj | − 1)!
R(ui, uj−1)
|Tρ(ui,uj−1)|!
)
= (m− 1)! (J(ui, ui)q(ui+1, uj ; s1, s2)J(ui+1, uj) + J(uj , uj)q(ui, uj−1; s1, s2)J(ui+1, uj))
= (m− 1)! (q(ui+1, uj ; s1, s2) + q(ui, uj−1; s1, s2)) J(ui, uj),
where the penultimate equality follows from the inductive hypothesis and Lemma 1, and the last equality follows
by noting that J(ui, ui)J(ui+1, uj) = J(uj , uj)J(ui+1, uj) = J(ui, uj). The claim (23) now follows from (8).
Finally, (9) follows by an inductive argument using (8), which we omit. The proof is now complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The proof follows easily from Theorems 5 and 6 of [14]. Consider the infection spreading along a path in Gn. Let
Π(t) be the counting process of the number of infected nodes in this path. The process Π(t) consists of exponentially
distributed arrivals with rate 1, and at most one arrival with rate 2 if the path is between the two infection sources.
Let Π1(t) be a unit rate Poisson process corresponding to the rate 1 arrivals. Then Π1(t) ≤ Π(t) ≤ Π1(t) + 1.
From Theorem 6 of [14], we have for any positive γ < 0.2,
P(Π(t) ≤ t(1− γ)) ≤ P(Π1(t) ≤ t(1− γ)− 1) ≤ exp
(
−
1
4
t(γ +
1
t
)2
)
,
P(Π(t) ≥ t(1 + γ)) ≤ P(Π1(t) ≥ t(1 + γ)) ≤ exp
(
−
1
4
tγ2
)
.
The rest of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 5 of [14], and the proof is complete.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first show that under (18), the interval (19) is non-empty. The condition (18) implies that
dmin >
3
2
+
√
2dmax
c2
b2
−
1
4
,
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s1 s2xn−1 x1 u0
u1
um
w1 wk v0
v1
vl
y1 yp−1
Fig. 9. Illustration of the network structure when u0 6= v0. Not all nodes are shown.
which after some algebraic manipulations yields
b2(dmin − 1)(dmin − 2) > 2c
2dmax,
1 ≤
cdmax
b(dmin − 1)
<
b(dmin − 2)
2c
.
Therefore (19) is a non-empty interval. Fix a δ in the interval. Then for all ǫ > 0 sufficiently small, we have
b(dmin − 1)(1 + δ)
cdmax
>
1
1− ǫ
,
b(dmin − 2)
2(1 + δ)c
>
1
1− ǫ
.
Recall that t is the time from the start of the infection spreading to our observation of Gn. From Lemma 3, for
each ǫ, there exists t0 such that if t ≥ t0, we have
(dmin − 1)(1 + δ)Nmin(t)
dmaxNmax(t)
> 1, (24)
(dmin − 2)Nmin(t)
2(1 + δ)Nmax(t)
> 1. (25)
We will make use of the two inequalities (24) and (25) extensively in the following proof steps. Let Et be the event
defined in Lemma 3. Then from Lemma 3, we have for t ≥ t0,
P(S˜ = S∗ | S∗) ≥ P(S˜ = S∗ | S∗, Et)P(Et | S
∗) ≥ (1− ǫ)P(S˜ = S∗ | S∗, Et). (26)
In the following, we show that P(S˜ = S | S, Et) = 1 for t ≥ t0. The proof then follows from (26) as ǫ can be
chosen arbitrarily small.
To show that P(S˜ = S | S, Et) = 1 is equivalent to showing that with probability one, C˜(S | Gn) > C˜(um, vl | Gn),
for all node pairs um, vl ∈ Gn such that at least one of them is not in S. Let u0 and v0 be the first nodes in ρ(s1, s2)
that are connected to um and vl respectively. We divide the proof into two cases, depending on whether u0 and v0
are distinct or not, as shown in Figures 9 and 10.
Suppose that u0 6= v0. A typical network for this case is shown in Figure 9, where m, l, n, p, and k are non-
negative integers, and at least one of um and vl is not in S, i.e., either m+ l > 0 or n+ p > 0. We let u0 = s1 if
n = 0, and v0 = s2 if p = 0.
We will show that if either m+ l > 0 or n+ p > 0, we have for t ≥ t0,
C˜(s1, s2 | Gn)
C˜(um, vl | Gn)
=
C˜(s1, s2 | Gn)
C˜(u0, v0 | Gn)
·
C˜(u0, v0 | Gn)
C˜(um, vl | Gn)
> 1. (27)
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The proof follows by showing that C˜(u0, v0 | Gn) ≥ C˜(um, vl | Gn), where strict inequality holds if m + l > 0,
and C˜(s1, s2 | Gn) ≥ C˜(u0, v0 | Gn) with strict inequality holding if n+ p > 0. From (17), we have 4
C˜(u0, v0 | Gn)
C˜(um, vl | Gn)
=
Q(u0, v0)
Q(um, vl)
·
∏
w∈ρ(um,u1)∪ρ(vl ,v1)
|Tw(u0, v0)|
−1
= [2(1 + δ)]−(m+l) ·
∏m+l+k+2
i=1 I
∗
i (um, vl)∏k+2
i=1 I
∗
i (u0, v0)
·
∏
w∈ρ(um,u1)∪ρ(vl ,v1)
|Tw(u0, v0)|
−1
≥ [2(1 + δ)]−(m+l) ·
m+l∏
i=1
I∗i (um, vl) ·
∏
w∈ρ(um,u1)∪ρ(vl ,v1)
|Tw(u0, v0)|
−1
≥
[
max{|Tu0(um, vl)|, |Tv0 (um, vl)|}
2(1 + δ) ·max {|Tu1(u0, v0)|, |Tv1(u0, v0)|}
]m+l
≥
[
(dmax − 2)Nmin(t) + 1
2(1 + δ) ·Nmax(t)
]m+l
> 1,
if m + l > 0. The first inequality follows because I∗m+l+i(um, vl) ≥ I∗i (u0, v0) for i = 1, . . . , k + 2, and the last
inequality follows from (25) when t ≥ t0.
Let ψ = degG(s1) + degG(s1). We have for t ≥ t0,
C˜(s1, s2 | Gn)
C˜(u0, v0 | Gn)
=
Q(s1, s2)
Q(u0, v0)
·
∏
w∈ρ(s1,x1)∪ρ(y1,s2)
|Tw(u0, v0)|
= [2(1 + δ)]n+p ·
k+2∏
i=1
I∗i (u0, v0)
n+p+k+2∏
i=1
I∗i (s1, s2)
·
∏
w∈ρ(s1,x1)∪ρ(y1,s2)
|Tw(u0, v0)|
≥ [2(1 + δ)]n+p ·
n+p+k+2∏
i=k+3
I∗i (s1, s2)
−1 ·
∏
w∈ρ(s1,x1)∪ρ(y1,s2)
|Tw(u0, v0)|
≥
[
2(1 + δ) ·min {|Ts1(u0, v0)|, |Ts2(u0, v0)|}
ψNmax(t) + 2
]n+p
≥
[
(1 + δ)(dmin − 1) ·Nmin(t) + 1 + δ
dmaxNmax(t) + 1
]n+p
> 1,
where the first inequality follows because I∗i (u0, v0) ≥ I∗i (s1, s2) for i = 1, . . . , k + 2, and the last inequality
follows from (24) if n+ p > 0. The bound (27) is now proved.
We next consider the case where u0 = v0 = w0 in Figure 10, where k,m and l are non-negative integers. When
t ≥ t0, we have the following bounds, which are straight forward to verify and whose proofs are omitted here.
(i) I∗i (um, vl) ≥ (ψ − 2)Nmin(t) + 2 ≥ (dmin − 2)Nmin(t) for i = 1, . . . , d(um, vl) + 1,
(ii) I∗i (s1, s2) ≤ ψNmax(t) + 2 ≤ 2dmaxNmax(t) + 2 for all i = 1, . . . , d(s1, s2) + 1,
4We define products over empty sets to be 1.
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s1
s2
w0 w1 w2 wk
v1 v2 vl
u1 u2 um
Fig. 10. Illustration of the case where u0 = v0 = w0.
r
s w1 wk
v1 v2 vl
ul u2 um
Fig. 11. A typical network for a single source tree.
(iii) |Twi(um, vl)| ≥ (ψ − 2)Nmin(t) + 2 ≥ (dmin − 2)Nmin(t) for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1,
(iv) |Tw(um, vl)| ≥ (dmin − 1)Nmin(t) + 1 for all w ∈ ρ(s1, s2),
(v) |Twi(s1, s2)| ≤ Nmax(t) for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1, and
(vi) |Tw(s1, s2)| ≤ Nmax(t) for all w ∈ ρ(um, vl).
The above bounds yield
C˜(s1, s2 | Gn)
C˜(um, vl | Gn)
=
Q(s1, s2)
Q(um, vl)
∏
w∈Gn\ρ(um,vl)
|Tw(um, vl)|∏
w∈Gn\ρ(s1,s2)
|Tw(s1, s2)|
=(2(1 + δ))d(s1,s2)−d(um,vl)
∏d(um,vl)+1
i=1 I
∗
i (um, vl)∏d(s1,s2)+1
i=1 I
∗
i (s1, s2)
∏k−1
i=1 |Twi(um, vl)|
∏
w∈ρ(s1,s2)
|Tw(um, vl)|∏k−1
i=1 |Twi(s1, s2)|
∏
w∈ρ(um,vl)
|Tw(s1, s2)|
=
k−1∏
i=1
|Twi(um, vl)|
|Twi(s1, s2)|
· (2(1 + δ))−d(um ,vl)−1
∏d(um,vl)+1
i=1 I
∗
i (um, vl)∏
w∈ρ(um,vl)
|Tw(s1, s2)|
· (2(1 + δ))d(s1,s2)+1
∏
w∈ρ(s1,s2)
|Tw(um, vl)|∏d(s1,s2)+1
i=1 I
∗
i (s1, s2)
≥
[
(dmin − 2)Nmin(t)
Nmax(t)
]k−1 [ (dmin − 2)Nmin(t)
2(1 + δ)Nmax(t)
]d(um,vl)+1 [(1 + δ)((dmin − 1)Nmin(t) + 1)
dmaxNmax(t) + 1
]d(s1,s2)+1
>1,
where the last inequality follows from (24) and (25). The theorem is now proved.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let t be the elapsed time from the start of an infection spreading from a single s to the time we observe Gn. We
wish to show that Algorithm TSE estimates as sources s and one of its neighbors with probability (conditioned on
s being the infection source) converging to 1 as t→∞. This is equivalent to showing that for t sufficiently large,
and for each pair of nodes um, vl ∈ Gn where either d(um, s) > 1 or d(vl, s) > 1, there exists a neighbor r of s
such that C˜(s, r | Gn) > C˜(um, vl | Gn).
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A typical network is shown in Figure 11, where k,m and l are non-negative integers. If m, l and k are positive,
we let r be the neighbor of s that lies on the path connecting s to um (i.e., the node w1 in Figure 11). If m and
l are positive and k = 0, then r is chosen to be either u1 or v1. If m = 0, we must have k > 0 so that wk = um
and r = w1. A similar remark applies for the case l = 0. Note that m+ l > 0. For t sufficiently large, we have
C˜(s, r | Gn)
C˜(um, vl | Gn)
=
Q(s, r)
Q(um, vl)
·
∏
w∈Gn\ρ(um,vl)
|Tw(um, vl)|
∏
w∈Gn\{s,r}
|Tw(s, r)|
= [2(1 + δ)]1−(m+l) ·
∏m+l+1
i=1 I
∗
i (um, vl)∏2
i=1 I
∗
i (s, r)
·
∏
w∈ρ(s,wk−1)
|Tw(um, vl)|∏k−1
i=2 |Twi(s, r)| ·
∏
w∈ρ(um,vl)
|Tw(s, r)|
= [2(1 + δ)]1−(m+l) ·
m+l∏
i=1
I∗i (um, vl) ·
∏k−1
i=1 |Twi(um, vl)|∏k−1
i=2 |Twi(s, r)| ·
∏
w∈ρ(um,vl)
|Tw(s, r)|
≥ [2(1 + δ)]1−(m+l) · |Twk(um, vl)|
m+l ·
|Ts(um, vl)|
k−1
Nmax(t)k−2 ·Nmax(t)m+l+1
≥ [2(1 + δ)]k ·
[
(dmin − 1)Nmin(t)
2(1 + δ) ·Nmax(t)
]m+l+k−1
> 1,
where the last inequality follows from (25) and Lemma 3. The proof of the theorem is now complete.
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